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Abstract: This paper aims at giving empirical content to the recent Basu & Weil (1998) theory of 
growth, in which localized innovation and differences in speeds of capital intensification can yield 
several patterns of international convergence and divergence. Using data envelopment analysis 
techniques, a decomposition is presented in which labor productivity growth is decomposed into 
growth due to localized innovation, creating spillover potential through investment and assimilation of 
knowledge spillovers. Regression analysis shows that convergence in the 1970s and divergence in the 
1980s were mainly driven by processes of creating spillover potential, but that the other two factors 
also had significant impacts. 
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Economists are still debating on the strengths and weaknesses of several concepts and measures of 
convergence. Nevertheless, there is agreement on the observation that productivity growth rates of the 
world’s countries do not converge to a common rate. The traditional neoclassical model (Solow, 1956) 
predicted such ‘absolute’ or ‘global’ convergence, due to its assumption of a single worldwide 
production function featuring decreasing marginal returns to capital. In such a neoclassical world, 
differences in labor productivity growth rates can merely be a temporary phenomenon, caused by 
initial differences in capital intensities. This view, however, could not stand attempts to verify it 
empirically. Baumol (1986) and a host of subsequent studies strongly rejected the implied hypothesis 
of global convergence (see, e.g., Sala -i-Martin, 1996, and many references therein). 
Broadly speaking, three avenues of research have been pursued to proceed towards a more 
satisfactory growth theory, which could account for the emergence of convergence clubs. First, the 
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital was relaxed in endogenous growth theories, 
such as Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). Consequently, two countries with identical savings rates but 
different initial capital-labor ratios are likely to experience different productivity growth rates in these 
models. 
Second, Mankiw et al. (1992) proposed to stick to the basics of the Solowian model, but to 
include human capital as a production factor, in addition to physical capital and (raw) labor. In this 
augmented Solow-model, steady state productivity growth rates can differ between countries, because 
they are dependent on the rates of investment in  human capital. Thus, these models can generate 
divergence between groups of countries. 
A third alternative is the ‘technology gap’ perspective. Proponents of this approach (e.g. 
Abramovitz, 1986, Verspagen, 1991, Fagerberg, 1994) argue that the Solowian assumption that all 
countries produce according to a common worldwide production function is wrong. They see 
technological differences as the prime cause for differences in GDP per capita across countries. 
Fundamental is the assumption that many countries are not able to benefit sufficiently from high-
productivity production processes operated elsewhere. In this approach the basic two variables of 
interest are the innovation rate of the leader(s) and the rates at which the relatively backward countries 
can catch-up through assimilating new knowledge. For a given rate of innovation, a ‘bifurcation rate’ 
can be calculated. Countries with a catch-up rate below this rate will face an ever-increasing gap, 
whereas countries with a higher rate will ultimately reach growth rates similar to the leader.  
Recently, Basu & Weil (1998) proposed a new theoretical model of international productivity 
growth dynamics, in which localized innovation is introduced as a force that can drive divergence. The 
model combines elements of the Solow model and the technology gap approach. Like the Solow 
model, the BW-model (henceforth, we will use this abbreviation) assumes that new knowledge about 
production technologies is immediately public. This new knowledge, however, is only relevant (or 





They will follow the innovator immediately, whereas other countries will not benefit at all, like in 
the technology gap approach.1 Thus, innovation by leaders does not shift the production possibilities 
frontier as a whole, but only a part in the neighborhood of the specific combination of production 
factors currently in use by the leader. If a country, for whatever reason, is not able to invest sufficient 
resources to adopt a capital intensity similar to that of the leader, this ‘localized innovation’ (originally 
introduced by Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1969) yields divergence. BW claim that their theoretical model can 
generate outcomes that are more in line with reality than the results obtained from endogenous growth 
models. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, and most prominently, it tries to give quantitative 
indications of the importance of localized innovation and BW’s notion of appropriate technology for 
patterns of convergence and divergence. The analysis will be based on observations for a variety of 
countries between 1970 and 1990. Second, an extension of the model is proposed. Countries 
characterized by comparable capital intensities turn out to attain quite different labor productivity 
levels. In many cases, these differences persist for quite a long time, which might be considered as 
evidence for a slow process of assimilation of knowledge about appropriate technologies as stressed 
by Nelson & Pack (1999). Barriers to benefiting from ‘spillover potential’ should thus be taken into 
account. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques, combined with a recently proposed 
decomposition of productivity growth and regression analysis, will provide a useful framework for 
empirical analysis of the sources of growth in the BW-model augmented with non-immediate 
spillovers. The methodology will be applied to Penn World Tables data on GDP, labor inputs and 
capital inputs. The decomposition results will be used in a convergence analysis based on regression 
techniques. Patterns of actual labor productivity growth are decomposed into three sources: localized 
innovation, assimilation of knowledge spillovers, and creating spillover potential through investment. 
The paper can be seen as a complement to the study of Kumar & Russell (2002) who used a 
comparable decomposition in a convergence analysis along the lines suggested by Quah (1996a). Our 
analysis, however, is linked much more strongly to a specific model of growth and offers more 
opportunities in terms of an economic interpretation of results.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the BW-model will be discussed in 
somewhat more detail and it is argued why assimilation should be included in the analysis. Further, the 
decomposition framework will be introduced and the relation between the theoretical and empirical 
approaches will be shown. Section 3 is devoted to a discussion of the data and the estimation of the set 
of best-practice production processes, which serves as the point of reference for the decomposition 
analysis. The empirical results will be presented and discussed in Section 4. Basically, this involves a 
decomposition of actual labor productivity growth rates into the effects of assimilation, creation of 
spillover potential through capital intensification and localized innovation. In Section 5, convergence 
and divergence of labor productivity rates will be studied on the basis of the contributions of the 
above-mentioned three sources of growth. Section 6 deals with an analysis of countries that emerge as 
outliers from the convergence regressions. It studies how the three sources of growth contributed to 
                                                                 
1 In the technology gap approach, countries may be too backward to benefit from spillovers. Generally, the 
degree of backwardness is measured by a proxy for social capabilities (Abra movitz, 1986), such as 
educational attainment, innovative activity, flexibility of credit markets and quality of infrastructure. In the 
BW-model, backwardness is expressed in capital intensities, although BW mention that their notion of 
capital can also include human capital. Irrespective of the exact meaning of capital, the concept of 
(in)appropriate technologies fits Abramovitz’ notion of technological (in)congruence well. 
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the extraordinary performance of these ‘miracles’ and ‘disasters’, as suggested by Temple (1999). 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Decomposition of Growth in a Model of Appropriate Technology 
Basics of the Basu & Weil (1998) model 
BW model growth and technology transfer in a world in which knowledge is specific to particular 
combinations of inputs. These combinations are called ‘technologies’. Technologies are considered to 
be ‘similar’ if they are characterized by comparable capital intensities (capital to labor ratios). More 
advanced technologies have higher capital intensities. Each technology has its own maximum labor 
productivity level. For reasons that will soon become clear, we will denote these maximum labor 
productivity levels as ‘targets’. Targets for advanced technologies are higher than for less capital-
intensive technologies. By producing with a specific capital intensity a country gains new knowledge 
about this particular technology and will improve the productivity level of this technology. In fact, 
countries not only improve the productivity of the specific technology they are using, but also raise the 
productivity levels of technologies with slightly different capital intensities. We will denote this 
process as ‘innovation’. 
An important assumption in the BW-model is that new knowledge generated in one country is 
immediately available to all other countries. However, the transfer of knowledge is not immediately 
relevant, because countries need time to achieve a level of development that can take advantage of the 
innovation by technology leaders. Due to the assumption of technology-specific knowledge, a follower 
country can only benefit from this knowledge if it is operating (or starts to operate) at a similar capital 
intensity. Otherwise, the new knowledge generated is not ‘appropriate’ for the follower country.2 
History is important, since a follower country benefits from productivity improvements made by a 
leader country in the past. For a particular technology, a follower country inherits earlier productivity 
improvements and thus starts from a higher productivity level than the leader did. As a result of the 
joint effects of localized technological progress, appropriate technology conditions and differences in 
investment rates, the labor productivity levels of (groups of) countries will most likely grow at 
different rates.  
An augmented empirical model of appropriate technology 
The BW view of the world can be illustrated by Figure 1. It depicts the capital intensities and labor 
productivity levels of 53 countries, in 1990.3 As BW suggest, technologies are ranked on the 
horizontal axis, indexed by their capital intensities. The vertical axis indicates the corresponding labor 
productivity levels that are attained. Two issues stand out immediately. First, more advanced 
technologies can generate higher labor productivity levels (compare the positions of Morocco (MAR), 
Canada (CAN) and the USA). This finding is in line with the BW assumptions. 
However, a second finding is clearly not in line with the BW setup. It can be seen that 
technologies are operated at a variety of labor productivity levels (compare France (FRA) and the 
USA). This observation is important, especially since longitudinal comparison of the positions of 
countries indicates that such differences are often persistent. In fact, there is large literature on 
                                                                 
2  Basu & Weil give the example of advances in transportation technology in Japan in the form of a refinement 
of the newest maglev train. Such an advance will have very few spillovers to the technology of the 
transportation sector in Bangladesh, which relies in a large part on bicycles and bullock charts. 
3 Details on the construction of the variables will be given in Section 3. 
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impediments to knowledge transfer, even in the case when it is appropriate. Assimilation is a costly 
process including costs for the acquisition of new technology, adoption costs to overcome its tacit 
nature, adaptation costs to adapt the new technology to local circumstances, and more generally 
switching costs for the change from one technology system to another (Evenson & Westphal, 1995, 
Nelson & Pack, 1999).  For the BW-model to have empirical relevance, such impediments to the 
transfer of knowledge specific to a technology must be taken into account. Therefore, our empirical 
analysis could be conceived as based on an ‘augmented BW-model’, in which a country’s ability to 
assimilate appropriate knowledge is considered as a separate determinant of growth. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The decomposition framework 
Figure 1 suggests that the upper observations together constitute a type of frontier, which is roughly 
represented by a logarithmic curve running from the origin to the upper right. From a neoclassical 
perspective, this frontier is a single best-practice technology from which producers can choose the 
most favorable input combination given relative prices. However, from the augmented-BW viewpoint, 
this frontier should be seen as the set of technology-specific targets. It indicates for each technology 
the maximum labor productivity level at which it can be operated, given the knowledge available at 
that time.  
We propose a decomposition of labor productivity growth into three sources: ‘assimilation’, 
‘creating potential’ and ‘localized innovation’. ‘Assimilation’ refers to the process where a country 
moves towards the frontier without moving it. It improves the level of productivity at which it is 
operating a particular technology, but it does not improve the level at the frontier. ‘Creating potential’ 
refers to the process of technology upgrading, measured here as capital intensification. By shifting to a 
more advanced technology a country opens up new possibilities for knowledge spillovers. This new 
technology will have a higher labor productivity target. ‘Localized innovation’ refers to movements of 
the frontier, that is improvements in the labor productivity targets of particular technologies. This is a 
movement of (part of) the frontier itself. 
Suppose the frontiers for period 0 and 1 are given by F(0) and F(1). These are depicted in Figure 
2 together with two observations for a particular country, indicated by *(0) and *(1).  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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4 See Maudos et al. (2000) for a similar decomposition framework. 
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The first right hand side factor (‘assimilation’) measures the ratio of the vertical distance to the frontier 
in period 1 to that in period 0. A value of Ayˆ  larger than 0 thus indicates that the country under 
consideration has succeeded in realizing part of its spillover potential by improving the productivity at 
which it operates a particular technology. The second factor is a Fisher index for vertical movements 
of the target due to a shift towards higher capital intensities, that is horizontal shift of the country 
considered. If Cyˆ  exceeds 0, the new appropriate technology for the country allows for a higher labor 
productivity level if all spillover potential would be used. The third factor is a Fisher index for vertical 
movements of the target due to localized innovation. If the first two factors would equal 1, a positive 
value for Iyˆ  means that the country gained from innovation by the leader for the appropriate 
technology (which may well be the country under consideration itself). 
 
3. Data and Frontier Methodology Analysis  
Data 
We used data on one type of output (GDP) and two types of inputs (labor and capital) from the Penn 
World Tables Mark 5.6. This data set gives GDP per worker and stocks of capital at international 
prices using expenditure PPPs from the International Comparison Program (see Summers & Heston, 
1991, for details). To obtain the number of workers we divided real GDP (series RGDPCH) by real 
GDP per worker (series RGDPW). For capital stocks, we used the stocks of producer durables 
calculated as the non-residential capital stock per worker (series KAPW) multiplied by the share of 
producer durables in the stock (series KDUR). We focus on producer durables rather than on total 
capital stocks as we believe the former is more interesting from a technology perspective. Technology 
transfer and embodied spillovers are mediated through machinery rather than through structures 
(DeLong & Summers, 1991). The annual data span the period from 1965 to 1990 and cover 53 
countries.5 
Frontier estimation using Data Envelopment Analysis 
In order to decompose labor productivity growth along the lines described above, a productivity 
frontier is needed. As discussed above, this frontier is the subset of observations that attain the highest 
labor productivity levels for the particular technologies they correspond to. Various approaches to the 
construction of production frontiers have been proposed and used in the literature. They either belong 
to the ‘econometric’ approach or to the ‘programming’ approach (see Lovell, 1993, for an overview). 
The econometric approach has a parametric nature and requires an a priori specification of the 
functional form of the frontier. In contrast, the programming approach is non-parametric, but has the 
drawback that it is deterministic and cannot accommodate for noise in the data. We will use the most 
common methodology within the programming approach (Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA) to 
                                                                 
5 PWT provides capital stock estimates for 63 countries, but we followed common practice by excluding less 
developed oil-exporting countries (Ecuador, Syria, Venezuela, Iran and Nigeria) and Sierra Leone because of 
its diamond mining activities. Further, we excluded Botswana, Nepal, Poland and Swaziland because data 
points were lacking for these countries. The total sample contained 1378 observations. 
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determine the frontiers.6 DEA involves the use of linear programming methods to construct a piece-
wise linear function over the data. Because of its non-parametric nature, it naturally allows for any 
form of localized technical change, which is an important feature in our framework.  
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale in capital and labor, the determination of the 
enveloping frontiers for one input (C/L) and one output (Y/L) as depicted in Figure 2 can be stated as 
a rather simple linear programming problem (see e.g. Coelli et al., 1998). Assume the data on the 
inputs and outputs are known for each of n countries. For the i-th country, they are represented by the 
scalars ci and yi respectively. Let c denote the (nx1)-input vector and y the (nx1)-output vector with 

























Primes denote transposed vectors, e  is an (nx1)-summation vector containing ones, ? is an (nx1)-
vector of constants and ?i are scalars (1=?i<8 ). The countries for which the envelopment problem 
yields ?i=1 together determine the position and shape of the frontier. Thus, ?i-1 is the proportional 
increase in output that could be achieved with the input quantities held constant and 1/?i indicates the 
level of technical inefficiency in Farrell’s (1957) sense. In our interpretation, these statistics indicate 
the spillover potential of country i. The model, an extension of the output-oriented model originally 
proposed by Charnes et al. (1978), allows for identification of a frontier which is convex. Increases of 
the target productivity are marginally decreasing with respect to increasing capital intensity as in the 
BW model.  
In most DEA studies, the frontier at time t is calculated using data from period t. However, if 
panel data are available, the history of data up to t can also be included. There are two important 
reasons to calculate the frontier at time t in this way. First, ‘technical regress’ is ruled out. Because the 
production frontier is constructed sequentially, it can never shift inward. Such a possibility of 
‘technical regress’ would have been awkward and hard to defend from a knowledge perspective on 
productivity, as it would involve ‘forgetting’. Second, as discussed above, a crucial element in the 
BW-model of appropriate technology is the possibility for countries to use knowledge generated by 
technology leaders in the past. Labor productivity levels of past technology leaders should be 
attainable for latecomers. Hence, we used all data up to and including period t in our construction of 
the frontier at time t.7  
A potential problem is that not all input-output combinations realized in the past have been 
observed as the data set sta rts only in 1965. It is possible that frontier techniques observed for the first 
years of the analysis are dominated by unobserved combinations in the past. In that case, part of what 
                                                                 
6 Although DEA was originally developed for firm-level analysis, it has frequently been used at the country 
level (see Färe et al., 1994, Perelman, 1995, and Kumar & Russell, 2002). An example of country level 
analysis by means of an econometric frontier estimation methodology is Koop et al. (2000). 
7 For the actual calculation of the frontiers, we made use of the DEAP computer program developed by Tim 
Coelli (see Coelli, 1996). 
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would be interpreted as frontier movements would in fact be assimilation of knowledge associated 
with these unobserved appropriate technology targets. To accommodate this problem, we limit the 
decomposition analysis to the time span that starts five years after the first observations available to 
us. Hence, the first year of the analysis will be 1970, for which we will estimate the frontier on the 
basis of observations for the period 1965-1970. 
 
4. Frontier and Decomposition Results  
Frontiers 
In Table 1 we provide an overview of the countries and techniques that determined the frontiers for 
1970 and 1990. Apparently, the frontier for 1990 does not solely consist of techniques in use in 1990. 
For example, the labor productivity level generated by Canada in 1973 with the technology used in 
that country at that time, had still not been surpassed by any other country in 1990, notwithstanding 
that other countries had used the same technology in the meantime. In 1990 itself, for example, 
countries such as Greece, Portugal, South Korea and Yugoslavia produced at comparable capital 
intensity levels as Canada did in 1973, but labor productivity levels in these countries were much 
lower. As a consequence, the technique used by Canada in 1973 still remained on the frontier as the 
best technique for that particular technology up to 1990. 8 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Figure 3 provides a sketch of the progress that was made for various technologies over the past 
decades. The figure gives the maximum labor productivity levels in 1980 and 1990 as a percentage of 
the corresponding targets in 1970, for a range of capital intensities. It is clearly shown that the most 
remarkable advances have been made in the technologies characterized by high capital intensities. 
Whereas technologies with an intensity below $30,000 were barely improved during the period from 
1970 to 1990, for technologies with capital intensities of more than $70,000 improvements of 10 
percent and more were attained.9 Interestingly, since 1980 innovation stagnated for a large range of 
intermediate technologies (roughly between $7,000 and $44,000). This is an important finding, given 
that in 1990 19 out of the 53 countries operated in this range of technologies, including countries such 
as Argentina, Thailand, Portugal and South Korea. This means that these countries could not benefit at 
all from progress being made at the frontier. The finding of a highly localized nature of innovation 
stresses the empirical relevance of the BW model, making it an important potential driver of 
divergence in the world economy.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
                                                                 
8 The number of observations that shape the frontiers does neither remain stable over time, nor does it increase 
monotonically. The minimum number of such techniques was 7 for 1973, the maximum 13 for both 1989 and 
1990. 




The estimated frontiers can be used to decompose a country’s labor productivity growth into three 
sources, as indicated in equation (1): assimilation of spillovers (movements towards the frontier), 
creating spillover potential through capital intensification (movements along the frontier) and 
innovation (movements of the frontier). In Figure 4 we provide such a decomposition for a limited 
number of countries, to illustrate the usefulness of the augmented BW model for analyzing growth. 
The left-hand side graphs show the development of actual labor productivity and the movement of the 
target, that is, the maximum labor productivity level attainable for the country’s technology as 
indicated by the frontier. The right-hand side graphs show changes in the actual labor productivity 
levels and its sources: assimilation, creating and innovation. Depicted is the cumulative index, taking 
1970 as the base year. The ‘total’ line corresponds to the ‘actual’ line in the left-hand side figure. 
A variety of growth patterns can be discerned. On the one hand, there is the case of the United 
States which relied on innovation as the main source of labor productivity growth, accounting for 
more than 70% (see Figure 4a) of actual growth in the period 1970-1990. In contrast, growth in 
Taiwan was mainly due to a rapid increase in capital intensity and increasingly by assimilation, that is, 
moving towards the frontier. This indicates that Taiwan first created the opportunities for rapid 
productivity growth by a swift move up the technology ladder, and later on started to effectively 
assimilate these new technologies, albeit from a very low level of efficiency as shown in the left-hand 
side figure. As it still not operated at those parts of the frontier where innovation took place, it could 
not benefit at all from innovations.  
The growth decomposition of West Germany illustrates that assimilation can also be a very 
effective source of growth. Up to 1980, growth was mainly driven by improving the efficiency of the 
operation of technologies that were gradually upgraded. After 1980, Germany entered the technology 
range where innovation took place and as a result it could benefit from innovation, making it the most 
important source of growth. The development in Mexico is completely different. It is characterized by 
an initial increase in the target labor productivity followed by a decrease. This went together with a 
long period of stagnation in the actual labor productivity level. In 1982, default of Brazil on its foreign 
debt obligations resulted in a ‘lost decade’ for the whole Latin-American continent. In particular, with 
soaring inflation, falling exchange rates and starvation of foreign capital, capital-intensity levels 
actually decreased quite dramatically. In effect, the target moved towards lower maximum labor 
productivity levels (see left-hand figure) and assimilation of knowledge about less-advanced 
technologies took place, arguably of the less-desired kind.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
5. Sources of convergence and divergence 
 
The previous section showed that innovation has been limited to a particular range of capital intensive 
technologies. Some countries benefited from global innovation, others did not. Further, some countries 
created spillover potential at a fast pace, whereas others appeared not to be able to increase their 
capital intensities to a substantial extent. Finally, some countries managed to assimilate knowledge 
related to appropriate technologies, while others did not get any closer to their target or even lost 
ground in this sense. Thus, all three sources of productivity growth identified in our augmented BW-
model could well exert forces towards divergence of labor productivity growth rates. In the remaining 
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sections of this paper, we will systematically investigate what impacts assimilation, creating spillover 
potential and innovation have had on the relative productivity growth performance of countries in the 
period 1970-1990. 
In the literature, a number of empirical concepts to study convergence have been proposed. In this 
section, we will look at the performance of the ‘representative’ country. We will do this by looking at 
the well-known concepts of s -convergence and ß-convergence.10 Quah (1996a,b) argued that 
unambiguous conclusions about convergence within a sample of countries can only be drawn by 
means of tools that study the dynamics of distributions (of productivity levels) themselves. 
Investigations of the dynamics of summary statistics on distributions only, could lead to misleading 
results due to the emergence of a bimodal distribution of productivity levels.11 However, since we are 
not only interested in convergence or divergence of productivity levels per se, but also in the factors 
underlying the performance of countries that did very well or very poorly, we will adopt a different 
perspective. As we will show, a study of ß-convergence also lends itself much more to a techno-
economic interpretation than Quah’s analysis. Afterwards, in the next section, we will investigate how 
the three determinants of productivity growth specified in the augmented BW-model affected the 
productivity growth performance of countries that apparently deviated from the general pattern. Many 
of these ‘miracles’ and ‘disasters’ are countries that switched from one peak to the other (either way) 
in Quah’s bimodal productivity distributions.  
Productivity gaps: s -convergence 
First, we will look at the dynamics of the mean and standard deviations of labor productivity gaps to 
the US. In the literature, a steady decline of standard deviations of productivity levels (normalized by 
taking logarithms) is called s-convergence. We will follow this definition, but consider the leader 
country as a specific point of reference. We will not only look at s-convergence of actual labor 
productivity levels, but also have a look at this type of convergence for the gaps between actual 
productivity levels and their corresponding targets on the one hand, and the gaps between targets and 
the target of the US on the other. This will give a first impression of the relative contributions to the 
actual pattern of (i) assimilation, and (ii) creating spillover potential and localized innovation. 
In Figure 5, the dynamics of three means and the corresponding standard deviations are depicted 
for the sample of 52 countries (53 countries minus the US). First, we have computed m(yT) and s(yT), 
the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of actual labor productivity levels relative to the 
US level. 12 Referring to the frontier for period 0 in Figure 2, these indicators refer to the distribution of 
the y0/yc ratios. Second, the curves denoted by m(yA) and s(yA) are obtained by calculating the means 
and standard deviations of y0/ya These indicators give insights into the effects of assimilation with 
respect to the appropriate technology. Third, m(yCI) and s(yCI) refer to the distributional dynamics of 
targets. Thus, these statistics relate to the joint effects of creation of spillover potential and localized 
innovation. They are computed on the basis of the distribution of the ratios ya/yc13.  
                                                                 
10 See e.g. Baumol (1986) and Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1991) for early contributions on both notions of 
convergence. A symposium in the Economic Journal  was devoted to discussions of the strengths and 
weaknesses of various concepts and measures (e.g. Sala -i-Martin, 1996, Bernard & Jones, 1996, and Quah, 
1996b)  
11 See Kumar & Russell (2002) for a convergence decomposition study along the lines set out by Quah (1996a).  
12 Although Table 1 indicates that Luxembourg was labor productivity leader in 1990, we will relate all levels 
to the US, in view of the fact that this country has attained the highest productivity levels during almost the 
entire period considered here.  
13 Note that this approach cannot distinguish between effects of creating spillover potential and effects of 
localized innovation, since both sources of productivity growth affect the labor productivity levels associated 
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[Figure 5 about here] 
 
The mean ratio to the US for actual labor productivity levels has gradually increased over time (that is, 
the mean gap decreased). Simultaneously, the standard deviations of the ratios to the US rose, be it at a 
slow pace. Together, these findings indicate that there was a general tendency towards convergence in 
our sample, but that some countries caught up at faster paces than others, which may even have fallen 
behind. This result is in line with much of the evidence presented by earlier convergence studies. 
As mentioned, our decomposition model allows us to analyze not only patterns of actual labor 
productivity convergence, but also of its sources. We find a slightly different pattern with regard to 
productivity growth as a consequence of assimilation. Until the beginning of the eighties, the mean 
ratio of labor productivity levels associated with actual techniques to the frontier of technology-
specific best techniques remained relatively constant, with the exception of a drop after the oil crisis. 
This leads us to the conclusion that assimilation generally did not contribute to convergence in these 
years. In most of the 1980s, this changed. The gaps to the frontier steadily became smaller. The 
standard deviation did hardly change, which indicates that assimilation of knowledge was a rather 
universal contributor to convergence in this period. 
Interestingly, Figures 5a/b indicate that the observed convergence of actual labor productivity 
levels in the 1970s was predominantly fuelled by catching-up in terms of targets. In theory, two 
phenomena could account for this. First, innovation could have been localized within ranges of 
technologies with lower capital intensities than the US technology. Figure 4, however, contradicts this 
explanation by and large. The second explanation, which states that many countries managed to adopt 
much more capital-intensive technologies with higher maximum productivity levels, seems much 
more in line with results in earlier convergence analyses. The standard deviation of the gaps gradually 
decreased, which suggests that this tendency was caused by developments within a substantial number 
of countries. 
From 1980 onwards, things seem to have changed rather dramatically. The gaps of technology-
specific targets to the US targets started to increase. Figure 4 already indicated that innovation was 
strongly localized within high capital intensity technologies. Further, the standard deviation of the 
ratios turns out to have increased relatively strongly after 1980. Apparently, some countries were able 
to benefit from high-end localized innovations, whereas others were not. Moreover, while attaining 
further productivity growth through assimilation, countries might have had difficulties in continuing to 
adopt increasingly capital intensive technologies.  
Our s-convergence results based on the decomposition framework can be summarized by two 
statements, on which the remainder of our analysis will focus.  
 
1) Assimilation on the one hand and localized innovation and spillovers as stressed by BW on the 
other require specific attention, although they produced a relatively steady average productivity 
catch-up of lagging countries to the US.   
2) In specific time periods (the 1970s and the 1980s, respectively), the performance of countries 
show increasing variability for a number of sources of productivity growth differentials. This 
implies that it is insufficient to investigate ‘representative behavior’. Special attention should be 
devoted to outliers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
with targets.   
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Productivity gaps: ß-convergence 
Another popular notion of convergence focuses on the question whether initially lagging countries 
tend to grow faster than countries initially close to the leader. If so, so-called ß-convergence prevails. 
Studies of ß-convergence can both be found in the mainstream tradition (in which it is mostly ascribed 
to the effects of diminishing returns to investment, see e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992) and in the technology 
gap literature (in which the main reason for ß-convergence to occur is the gradual assimilation of 
knowledge related to new innovations, see e.g. Verspagen, 1991).  





















,0logˆˆ    ,       (2) 
 
in which hats denote annual growth rates, averaged over the period under consideration. The left-hand 
side of the equation represents the productivity growth performance of a country relative to that of the 
United States (the notation is as in equation (1)). A negative bT would indicate that backward countries 
do better than countries close to the US, as we chose the logarithm of the ratio between the country’s 
initial labor productivity and the US initial labor productivity as the exogenous variable.14 A negative 
bT would not necessarily mean, however, that most countries close the productivity gap to the United 
States. A negative value for aT would imply that the average country would lose in productivity terms 
to the US, if it would have had an initial productivity level identical to the US level (indicated by a 
zero logarithm on the right hand side).  
We report estimates for three periods, 1970-1990 and the subperiods 1970-1980 and 1980-1990. 
It should be noted that the explanatory variable is always evaluated in 1970. Hence, the performance 
of a country in 1980-1990 is also linked to its productivity position in 1970. The results are depic ted in 
Figures 6a-6c. 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
In all three panels, the horizontal zero-line indicates the productivity growth rate exactly equal to the 
US. Apparently, the majority of countries grew faster than the US in terms of labor productivity in the 
early subperiod, but slower in the later period. The dotted logarithmic curves represent the estimated 
relationships. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows that the slopes do not deviate from 0 at the 10% significance level, except for the 1980-
1990 subperiod. 15 The positive estimate implies that very backward countries on average performed 
                                                                 
14 Note that we do not allow for parameter heterogeneity. Verspagen (1991) and Durlauf & Johnson (1995) 
proposed specifications in which the ability to benefit from (non-localized) spillovers -as indicated by ßT- is 
dependent on the size of the initial gap. We support this view of nonlinear catch-up, but are of the opinion 
that such an analysis would be beyond the scope of the present paper.  
15 White’s procedure to compute heteroscedasticity-consistent t-values  was used. 
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worse than less backward countries in this decade. In other words, divergence prevailed. The constant 
term turns out to be positive for the entire period and, in particular, for the early subperiod.  
This is in line with the upward tendency emerging from Figure 5a (m(yT)) and suggests that the 
follower countries were on average more conducive to productivity growth than the US. The huge 
variety of growth performances as evidenced by all three panels is reflected in the very low values for 
R2. 
To get more insight into the role played by the determinants of productivity growth as specified 
in our augmented BW-framework, we also ran regressions similar to equation (2), based on the 
decomposition results. That is, we specified regression equations as follows: 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 3. The second column of the top panel shows that 
differences in assimilation performance may have widened the gap between the US productivity level 
and the productivity levels of other countries. Only for the entire time span, however, the negative 
coefficient for aA is significant at 10%. In both decades, countries that initially operated well below 
the frontier managed to get faster to the frontier than countries relatively close to the frontiers 
(negative estimates for ßA). Assimilation of knowledge with respect to appropriate technologies thus 
appears to be an important source of convergence. 
The middle panel indicates that creation of spillover potential by capital intensification has had a 
far from steady impact on convergence throughout the period under consideration, unlike assimilation. 
For the period as a whole, a clear tendency towards convergence due to creation of spillover potential 
is revealed. This result appears to have been driven entirely by the developments in the first decade, 
however. For this subperiod, the absolute value of the estimated negative coefficient ßC is large, and 
the autonomous productivity growth through creating spillover potential was substantial. In the period 
1980-1990, though, this source of labor productivity growth has caused a clear tendency towards 
divergence, which is in line with the results for actual labor productivity convergence documented in 
Table 2. 
The bottom panel of Table 3, finally, gives a more systematic insight into the convergence effects 
of localized innovation. The estimated intercepts are significantly negative, irrespective of the specific 
time span considered. Moreover, the estimated slope coefficients are positive, although not significant 
at 10% in the later decade. Both results reveal that localized innovation has put a pressure towards 
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divergence on labor productivity growth rates. It should be noted, though, that the estimated ßs are an 
order of magnitude smaller than the corresponding estimates presented in Tables 3a and 3b. 
This section studied the empirical implications of the sources of productivity growth that we 
specified in our augmented BW-framework for worldwide patterns of convergence and divergence. 
Localized innovation appeared as a force towards divergence, whereas assimilation had effects in the 
opposite direction. Creating spillover potential turned out to be important for convergence in the 
1970s, but provided an important contribution to divergence of actual productivity levels in the 1980s. 
The next section does not look at the relative importance of the three determinants for the general 
pattern, but investigates how influential these factors were for the performance of countries that 
clearly deviated from this general pattern. 
 
6. Outlier Analysis: Miracles and Disasters  
 
Complementary to the ‘representative’ behavior as found from the regression analysis, we would also 
like to study the performance of ‘non-representative’ countries. In this respect, we follow a suggestion 
made by Temple (1999) to focus more in depth on ‘miracles’ and ‘disasters’. Did productivity growth 
‘miracles’ mainly benefit from assimilation, or from one or both of the other two sources of labor 
productivity growth in the augmented BW-model? And which of these determinants accounted for the 
bad fate of productivity growth ‘disasters’? In our view, such questions are at least as important as the 
questions answered in the previous section. 
As a first step ‘miracles’ and ‘disasters’ should be identified. We do this in a rather 
straightforward way. The upper and lower curves in Figure 5 indicate the bounds of the (two-sided) 
80% confidence intervals associated with regression equation (2). Miracles and disasters are identified 
by positions above the upper bound and below the lower bound, respectively. We followed a similar 
procedure for regression equations (3a-c), to identify the outliers with respect to the three separate 
sources of productivity growth. 
The leftmost columns of Table 4 indicate the outliers with regard to actual labor productivity 
growth. The miracles are the usual suspects, i.e. the Asian Tigers. Not surprisingly, the disasters are 
mainly located in Africa and Latin America. Interestingly, miracles in the first subperiod tend to 
emerge as miracles in the second subperiod, too. A similar, but less pronounced, tendency can be 
observed for disasters. Thus, the actual performances of ‘non-representative’ countries appear to be 
characterized by some persistence. 
Hong Kong, identified as one of the growth miracles, seems to owe much of its performance to 
effective assimilation. It appears as an assimilation miracle in both subperiods. Another miracle, 
Korea, seems to have followed a different route. During the period 1970-1980, the country created 
much spillover potential, at the cost of an assimilation disaster. It invested heavily in more capital-
intensive technologies but without learning how to use them in a way comparable to the appropriate 
technology leaders. In the second subperiod, though, it proved capable of performing outstandingly 
with respect to both assimilation and creating spillover potential. Taiwan also appears as a miracle 
with regard to actual productivity growth in both subperiods. This was based on an extraordinary 
performance in creating spillover potential in the first period and ‘representative’ behavior with regard 
to the other sources of productivity growth in both subperiods. 16 Rapid growth in Thailand is not due 
                                                                 
16 See Timmer (2000) for a much more elaborate study of the productivity performance of East-Asian 
countries. 
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to a particular source, without extreme contributions of either assimilation or capital intensification. 
None of these countries benefited in particular from innovations as they operated technologies that are 
still far away from the technologies in use in innovating countries. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Once more, the innovation miracles exemplify the highly non-linear pattern of worldwide innovation. 
For both subperiods, the positive outliers are found at the extreme ends of the spectrum of 
technologies. In the high capital intensity range, countries like Switzerland, Germany and Canada 
apparently benefited most strongly from innovation. Interestingly, Chile, Zimbabwe, Malawi and 
Morocco turn out to be miracles in benefiting from localized innovation as well, at least during one of 
the subperiods. Some of these countries, with a very low initial target labor productivity level 
amounting to 10-15% of the US target level, emerge as localized innovation miracles due to 
Morocco’s performance.17 This country managed to push the frontier outward, whereas the frontier 
remained stable within a range of higher capital intensities (see Table 1). 
Turning our attention to disasters with regard to actual labor productivity growth, we find that a 
lack of ability to create spillover potential has been the main cause of bad performance. Countries like 
Zambia, Peru and Jamaica also lost ground due to the localized nature of innovation. The majority of 
these innovation disasters are Latin-American countries that used mid-range capital intensity 
technologies, for which the 1970 maximum labor productivity levels amounted to about 45% of the 
US level. These countries were identified as innovation disasters since both at lower and higher capital 
intensity levels at least some innovation took place (see Figure 3).  
 
7. Conclusions  
 
This study provides an empirical framework to study the labor productivity growth performance of 
countries from a perspective suggested by a recent model of economic growth (Basu & Weil 1998). A 
prominent feature of this model is the localized nature of innovation. Innovations for capital-intensive 
technologies will not affect the performance of capital-extensive technologies, and the other way 
round. We augment the model by relaxing the assumption of immediate spillovers. Assimilation of 
technologies new to a country is a costly process as stressed by Nelson & Pack (1999). As a result, 
many countries perform well below the best practice at similar technologies. 
A decomposition framework suggested by the augmented BW-model was implemented by 
estimating a global production frontier, which indicates for each technology the maximum labor 
productivity level at which it can be operated, given the knowledge available at that time. . Actual 
labor productivity growth was decomposed into the effects of assimilating knowledge pertaining to 
particular technologies, creating potential to benefit from more productive technologies, and localized 
innovation. Analysis of convergence processes suggests that localized innovation causes a tendency 
towards divergence. At low levels of capital intensity, hardly any innovation was found, whereas the 
frontier was steadily pushed at high capital intensities. In the 1970s, both assimilation and creating 
spillover potential through capital intensification appeared to contribute to convergence. In the 1980s, 
                                                                 
17 Malawi’s (1970-1980) miracle status is an artifact. This country did not benefit from any shift of the frontier 
at all in this period. Given its extremely low initial capital intensity, the estimated loglinear relationship 
predicts an inward shift of the frontier for low capital intensities. Such technical regress was ruled out by our 
construction of the frontiers.  
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this picture changed dramatically, as creating spillover potential contributed forcefully to apparent 
overall divergence of productivity growth rates. 
The convergence regressions enabled us to have a closer look at the performance of outliers. The 
extraordinary growth rates found for Asian ‘miracle’ countries turned out to be the result of a non-
homogeneous mix of contributions. Hong Kong relied heavily on assimilation, whereas Korea and 
Taiwan started their advance by creating huge spillover potentials, which were partly realized later on. 
Many disasters were found in Latin-America, apparently due to negative tendencies with regard to 
creating spillover potential. In 1990, many developing countries were stuck within a range of 
technologies characterized by low capital intensities with little  potential for further growth by means 
of spillovers. 
In our view, the results of this study ask for a number of future research efforts. First, the analysis 
is based on aggregate economies. Some of them experienced rapid industrialization, whereas others 
had already entered the stage of tertiarization and still others generated their outputs predominantly in 
agricultural activity. Sector-specific analyses would add to the empirical operationalization of the 
appropriate technology concept. Second, it may be worthwhile to link both assimilation performances 
and creating spillover potential performances to determinants like schooling, infrastructure, openness 
to trade, etc. In earlier convergence studies, such factors turned out to be critical but it is unknown 
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Table 1: Input-output combinations on frontier in 1970 and 1990 
Frontier in 1970  Frontier in 1990 
  C/L (a) Y/L (b)    C/L (a) Y/L 
(b) 
Malawi 1965 159 846  Malawi 1965 159 846 
Ivory Coast 1965 947 2,674  Morocco 1990 2,489 6,770 
Morocco 1965 1,719 4,428  Spain 1965 6,503 12,451 
Spain 1965 6,503 12,451  Argentina 1969 8,337 14,110 
Argentina 1969 8,337 14,110  Argentina 1971 9,350 15,029 
Spain 1969 10,699 16,024  Spain 1969 10,699 16,024 
Canada 1966 27,151 23,145  Argentina 1980 14,462 17,828 
Canada 1969 32,098 24,746  Canada 1973 34,969 27,426 
USA 1966 53,205 29,152  Canada 1979 43,970 29,191 
USA 1968 60,603 30,192  Canada 1988 73,186 34,521 
USA 1969 63,652 30,637  Canada 1989 80,240 35,069 
     USA 1989 114,128 36,859 
     Luxembour
g 
1990 177,813 37,903 
Notes: (a) Producer durable capital stock per worker (in 1985 International $) 
(b) GDP per worker (in 1985 International $) 
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Table 2: Regression results, actual labor productivity 
growth vs. initial gaps to the US.  
Period aT ßT R2 
70-90  0.0055  (p=0.009)  0.0021 (p=0.313) 0.018 
70-80  0.0127  (p=0.000)  -0.0026 (p=0.192) 0.025 









Table 3: Regression results, by source of productivity growth.  
Assimilation (equation 2a) 
Period aA ßA R2 
70-90 -0.0055  (p=0.096) -0.0112 (p=0.012) 0.132 
70-80 -0.0063  (p=0.195)  -0.0116 (p=0.045) 0.062 
80-90 -0.0051  (p=0.112) -0.0116 (p=0.034) 0.089 
Creating spillover potential (equation 2b) 
Period aC ßC R2 
70-90  0.0000  (p=0.989) -0.0053 (p=0.014) 0.057 
70-80  0.0036  (p=0.028)  -0.0196 (p=0.000) 0.558 
80-90 -0.0006  (p=0.827)  0.0129 (p=0.012) 0.113 
Innovation (equation 2c) 
Period a I ßI R2 
70-90 -0.0018  (p=0.000) 0.0016 (p=0.001) 0.193 
70-80 -0.0006  (p=0.025)  0.0032 (p=0.000) 0.730 
80-90 -0.0037  (p=0.000) 0.0014 (p=0.132) 0.052 
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1 Malawi 1 1 
2 Kenia 3 3 
3 India 4 7 
4 Madagascar 2 2 
5 Zimbabwe 6 5 
6 Thailand 8 14 
7 Zambia 5 4 
8 Ivory Coast 7 6 
9 Sri Lanka 9 12 
10 Philippines 10 9 
11 Honduras 11 8 
12 Paraguay 17 13 
13 South Korea 18 26 
14 Turkey 15 20 
15 Mauritius 16 23 
16 Morocco 14 15 
17 Bolivia  13 11 
18 Taiwan 24 30 
19 Dominican Republic  19 17 
20 Guatemala  20 18 
21 Jamaica 12 10 
22 Colombia 22 22 
23 Yugoslavia  27 21 
24 Panama 23 19 
25 Portugal 25 27 
26 Hongkong 28 32 
27 Peru 21 16 
28 Greece 29 29 
29 Japan 30 31 
30 Chile 26 24 
31 Ireland 32 34 
32 Mexico 33 28 
33 Argentina 31 25 
34 Iceland 39 36 
35 Israel 34 33 
36 Spain 36 38 
37 Finland 38 41 
38 Austria  40 39 
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39 United Kingdom 35 40 
40 Italy 44 47 
41 Norway 43 43 
42 Denmark 37 35 
43 Germany  46 44 
44 France 45 46 
45 Belgium 48 49 
46 Sweden 42 42 
47 New Zealand 41 37 
48 Canada 50 51 
49 Australia  47 45 
50 The Netherlands 51 48 
51 Luxembourg 49 53 
52 Switzerland 52 50 
53 United States  53 52 
 
Figure 1: Labor Productivity Levels and Capital Intensity Levels  


















Notes: C/L = Producer durable capital stock per worker (in 1985 International $) 
Y/L = GDP per worker (in 1985 International $) 
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Figure 3: Movement of Frontier Labor Productivity Levels for a Range of 






0 20,000 40 ,000 60 ,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000
















1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0  
 26 
 
Figure 4  Movement of target and actual labor productivity levels, and decomposition of 
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